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1
 A menacing cloud hangs across the Pacific, over relations between 
China and the United States, according to the title of Thomas Metzger’s 
groundbreaking new book. The book’s subtitle, however, refers to a clash 
between China and the West. In the book itself, Metzger shifts flexibly, often 
imperceptibly, between these two distinct loci of tension, motivated by two 
closely related concerns. On the one hand, he is interested in actual politi-
cal conflicts, especially those that cast “a deep shadow over the prospects 
for world peace in the next century” (2). There is little doubt that such con-
flicts exist more between China and the United States than between China 
and Europe (or loosely speaking, between China and the West as a whole); 
in any case, two distinct if related sets of conflicts are identifiable here. On 
the other hand, Metzger takes actual political conflicts to result in large part 
boundary 2 34:3 (2007) DOI 10.1215/01903659-2007-015 © 2007 by Duke University Press
Book Reviewed: Thomas A. Metzger, A Cloud Across the Pacific: Essays on the Clash 
Between Chinese and Western Political Theories (Shatin, Hong Kong: Chinese University 
Press, 2005). This work is cited parenthetically by page number only.
62 boundary 2 / Fall 2007
from philosophical differences over how to think about politics, about knowl-
edge, and especially about the relationship between the two. In address-
ing such philosophical differences, the subject matter of his book, Metzger 
speaks of China and the West, and in this context there is something to be 
said for this pairing.
 Metzger’s highly sustained attempt to probe beneath conflicts of 
national interests in search of underlying epistemic differences—in his own 
words, “to uncover the epistemological basis of a major pattern of interna-
tional tension today” (147)—makes A Cloud Across the Pacific a work of 
uncommon interest and importance that deserves wide critical attention. 
According to the author, what separates China and the West is an episte-
mic divide, above all, a divide created by a modern Western paradigm shift 
in the conception of knowledge that has yet to take place in China. Metz-
ger calls this paradigm shift the Great Modern Western Epistemological 
Revolution (GMWER), claiming that the paradigmatic epistemic differences 
that result from embracing or rejecting this revolution are the root cause of 
more tangible conflicts of interests between China and the West, especially 
between China and the United States. It is on account of these fundamen-
tal epistemic differences that each side views the other not as a competi-
tor in a shared game but, at worst, as a force that is immoral and irratio-
nal (2–3). This unnecessary elevation of the stakes, in Metzger’s view, is 
what makes for the depth and intensity of the clash between China and the 
United States.
 It follows that the key to improved political relations is to clarify and 
resolve the fundamental epistemic differences that underlie the surface 
conflict of national interests, making it resistant to pragmatic calculation 
and compromise. In other words, the best way to approach the actual politi-
cal conflicts between China and the United States is to look at the clash 
between Chinese and Western political theories as repositories of ways of 
conceiving knowledge, politics, and the relation between them. What, then, 
is the clash between Chinese and Western political theories referred to in 
the subtitle of the book?
2
 Metzger wisely approaches this clash in terms of differences between 
discourses rather than differences between entire cultures. “A large popu-
lation regarded as ‘a society’ or ‘a culture’ typically consists of a number 
of such we-groups [a we-group being a set of people who share the same 
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basic premises and can speak in terms of ‘we’]. The discourse of each 
partly overlaps, partly conflicts with the discourses of other we-groups, 
and the degree of overall integration varies greatly from society to society. 
Unless one can demonstrate a high degree of such integration or show that 
a population possesses only one discourse, one cannot precisely describe 
‘a culture.’ That is, one can precisely describe only particular discourses” 
(76). The discourses that are the main objects of Metzger’s analysis are 
mainstream modern Chinese political thought (dubbed discourse #1) and 
mainstream modern Western political thought (dubbed discourse #2), dis-
courses in which, according to Metzger, can be found the epistemic clashes 
that inform the political conflicts between China and the United States.
 For Metzger, “the discourse of any we-group is based on ideas 
regarded as indisputable by that we-group, and . . . we-groups loosely use 
generic labels like ‘reasonable,’ ‘truth,’ and ‘knowledge’ to lump together 
all the kinds of thinking based on these indisputables and to reject all the 
kinds that are not” (78). Well, it does not seem indisputable to me that the 
premises upon which a group of people think and act have to be indisput-
able to them. What is often the case is that such premises do not appear 
disputable to the people whose premises they are, and this is not because 
the premises have been subjected to scrutiny and found to be indisputable 
but because they have not been, and thus the question of their disputability 
or indisputability simply does not arise. In the event that the question has 
arisen and received a positive answer, all that seems to be necessary for 
such premises to serve as a basis of thinking and acting is for them to be 
considered plausible or not too implausible. In either case, the concept of 
indisputability misses what is going on, and nondisputability seems more 
appropriate: something is nondisputable either in the sense that it is simply 
not called into dispute or in the sense that it is considered sufficiently plau-
sible not to make (further) dispute imperative or necessary.
 This way of looking at the matter should help rather than undermine 
Metzger’s comparative project. For one of the things that sets discourse #1 
and discourse #2 radically apart is precisely whether and to what extent 
such nondisputables (I use this term to match Metzger’s “indisputables”) 
are subjected to scrutiny and critique. Discourse #2 may be said to repre-
sent the limit case, in which the standard used in such scrutiny and critique 
is nothing less than indisputability. Metzger’s notion of indisputables is quite 
apt with regard to this particular attitude toward nondisputables but, by the 
same token, inappropriate for describing the much less unyielding attitude 
that is characteristic of discourse #1. There is a sense in which the readiness 
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and severity with which nondisputables are subjected to critical dispute are 
a measure of how seriously they are taken. The more seriously they are 
taken, the stronger the incentive to prove that they are indeed indisput-
able, and so the greater the readiness to place them under scrutiny and to 
perfect the intellectual apparatus with which to do so. Paradoxically, all this 
increases the probability that ideas that have been nondisputable hitherto 
will turn out not to be indisputable and that what are treated as indisput-
able today will prove to be less than indisputable tomorrow. This profound 
paradox lies at the heart of what Metzger calls epistemological pessimism, 
for him the preeminent feature of discourse #2, just as the absence of this 
paradox marks the epistemological optimism of discourse #1.
3
 The distinction between epistemological optimism and epistemologi-
cal pessimism was first drawn by Karl Popper to describe two opposite mis-
takes of thinking. Metzger uses these terms not to refer, as Popper does, 
to the extreme readiness to believe or not to believe, but rather to desig-
nate two ways of balancing credulity and skepticism (22). Still, in Metz-
ger’s scheme of things, discourse #1 (mainstream modern Chinese political 
thought) is essentially optimistic, and discourse #2 (mainstream modern 
Western political thought) is essentially pessimistic, and this, according 
to Metzger, is a fundamental epistemic difference with important political 
implications.
 Discourse #1 is epistemologically optimistic, or so it appears, about a 
wide range of things, as Metzger’s discussion shows, a range that includes 
the power of human understanding, the goodness of human nature, the 
efficacy of education, the feasibility of implementing moral ideals, the incor-
ruptibility of good leaders, and so on. Within this mix, three categories can, 
I think, be usefully identified. The first is a purely or largely epistemic opti-
mism, which places huge confidence in human epistemic powers. This opti-
mism is reflected in such features of Chinese thought as the obliviousness 
of the historicity of knowledge, the treatment of all aspects of the world as 
forming a unity accessible to human comprehension, and the concomitant 
absence of the fact/value distinction (53, 66, 127–28). Distinct from, though 
obviously related to, this epistemic optimism is a moral-political optimism, 
an optimism about human moral powers (not least about the ability to over-
come selfishness) and about the kind of political institutions that such moral 
powers make practicable. It does not follow either from epistemic optimism 
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or from moral-political optimism, or indeed from their combination, however, 
that government should take the form of “top-down control,” that is, “a cor-
rigible political center” presided over by “moral-intellectual virtuosi” (24). 
The preference for this kind of government must rest on a further premise, 
namely, the superiority of a select few in epistemic and moral powers to 
ordinary people who have enough ability only to follow. Epistemic-moral 
elitism, then, is a third element that needs to be identified.
 Thus, when Metzger asks, “Is the kind of knowledge needed fully 
and perfectly to organize society available? Or, to put the matter more mod-
estly, to what extent should people such as children, students, and ordi-
nary citizens believe that there are people who have more knowledge than 
they about how they should think and live, and whose authority over them 
should therefore be respected?” (21), he is conflating questions of epistemic 
power, moral power, and epistemic-moral inequality. Once we keep these 
questions separate and bear in mind the three distinct elements that make 
up Chinese epistemological optimism, we see more clearly the tensions 
and possibilities that exist in this complex position. Metzger is quite right, 
for example, to distinguish between “(a) the belief in blind, unconditional 
compliance with the commands of persons occupying socially established 
positions of authority, such as parents, teachers, and government officials, 
and (b) the belief that one should autonomously search in one’s own con-
science for the universally true principles of life (the tao) and then com-
pletely obey anyone who knows what these principles are” (20). However, if 
such a distinction goes together well enough with epistemic and moral opti-
mism in theory, it nevertheless tends in practice to be more or less neutral-
ized by epistemic-moral elitism, especially by the political and educational 
institutions that rest on such elitism. Thus, it is a considerable exaggeration 
to say, as Metzger does, that the Chinese brand of authoritarianism “legiti-
mizes defiance of conventionally established political leaders as easily as it 
does respect for them” (20, my emphasis), although one should obviously 
not be surprised if this potential for defiance is realized once in a while.
4
 The rareness with which the radical potential of epistemological 
optimism—not least its potential for benevolent government and equal citi-
zenship—is realized should alert us to the possibility that epistemological 
optimism is not utopian but ideological. I am drawing, of course, on Karl 
Mannheim’s well-known distinction. According to Mannheim, “Only those 
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orientations transcending reality will be referred to by us as utopian which, 
when they pass over into conduct, tend to shatter, either partially or wholly, 
the order of things prevailing at the time.” And he continues:
In limiting the meaning of the term “utopia” to that type of orienta-
tion which transcends reality and which at the same time breaks 
the bonds of the existing order, a distinction is set up between the 
utopian and the ideological states of mind. One can orient himself 
to objects that are alien to reality and which transcend actual exis-
tence—and nevertheless still be effective in the realization and the 
maintenance of the existing order of things. In the course of history, 
man has occupied himself more frequently with objects transcend-
ing his scope of existence than with those immanent in his existence 
and, despite this, actual and concrete forms of social life have been 
built upon the basis of such “ideological” states of mind which were 
congruent with reality.
 In the light of Mannheim’s still highly illuminating distinction, I have 
serious reservations about Metzger’s description of Chinese epistemo-
logical optimism as a species of utopianism. According to Metzger, “Chi-
nese utopianism . . . differs from the Platonic idea of a perfect state imag-
ined by someone realizing it is impracticable. This concept is missing in 
the history of Chinese political thought. What is basic to this history is a 
concept of political perfection put forward by Chinese believing it is prac-
ticable” (20). The crux of the matter is practicability. In the very long time 
span of the Chinese tradition, belief in the practicability of some perfection-
ist vision may have been held at one point or another, in which case the 
discourse of optimism would indeed have bespoken a utopian mentality. 
But it is surely implausible to ascribe a utopian mentality to purveyors of a 
utopian-sounding discourse who saw its “practicability” fail to materialize 
generation after generation, who had little evidence that the political and 
educational institutions erected on the basis of belief in this practicability 
had really worked, and yet who, apparently immune to disillusionment, con-
tinued to propagate their vision of an ideal society and ideal rulers and 
speak of both in seemingly practicable terms. The only plausible explana-
tion for this otherwise puzzling phenomenon, it seems to me, is that the 
utopian-sounding discourse actually was, or had turned into, an ideological 
one. There is no better proof than in the fact that “the situationally transcen-
1. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936), 192.
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dent ideas . . . never succeed de facto in the realization of their projected 
contents”—the more so the longer the time span involved. This applies not 
only to the better part of the immensely long (loosely called) Confucian tra-
dition (Metzger calls it discourse #6) but also to the somewhat toned down 
continuation of socialist-communist rhetoric after the demise of Mao and 
Maoism if not before.
 Metzger gives the impression that what he calls Chinese utopianism 
is an enduring feature of the Chinese tradition, a moral and political ideal 
that has informed the actions and tempers of generation after generation of 
Chinese.
One can (1) be determined to act decisively to end completely all 
this moral-intellectual dissonance [i.e., selfishness, corruption, irra-
tionality, etc.]; (2) give up this radical, transformative hope but still 
denounce the dissonance as inexcusable and intolerable; (3) regard 
this dissonance as the normal medium of accommodative, peaceful, 
piecemeal, gradualistic, progressive political efforts; (4) deplore but 
opportunistically accommodate this dissonance; or (5) fatalistically 
accept it.
 Certainly all five attitudes can be found in China today or per-
haps even in any major society. In China, however, the four prem-
ises above [see p. 695] made up a coherent, widespread intellectual 
standpoint morally legitimizing options #1 and #2 and utterly incom-
patible with the moral legitimization of option #3. It is this extremely 
prominent and optimistic concept of political practicability for which 
the term “Chinese utopianism” is suitable. (700)
 If this picture of Chinese utopianism is true, the Chinese must be 
utterly irrational, the “moderate realism” noted by Metzger notwithstanding. 
The worst enemy of minimally rational belief in the practicability of a perfec-
tionist vision is time, and more than enough time has passed and setbacks 
occurred to make continuing belief in the political practicability of realizing 
either Confucian or communist ideals close to farcical. To show something 
2. Mannheim, Ideology, 194.
3. For Metzger, utopianism is a thread that runs through the entire Chinese tradition right 
up to the present. “I would especially emphasize,” he writes, “the continuity of a Chi-
nese epistemological scene free of epistemological pessimism, the utopian belief in the 
political practicability of greatly reducing the role of selfishness in political-economic life, 
and the belief that societal transformation can be accomplished by intellectual virtuosi 
as super-citizens working with a corrigible political center. All these ideas were central 
equally to the modern Chinese discourse #1 and the Confucian discourse #6” (88).
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to be farcical is not to prove it untrue, to be sure, but this does make advis-
able the search for an alternative explanation compatible with the Chinese 
being minimally rational.
 It is in the search for such an explanation that the possibility of an 
ideological use of utopian-sounding discourse presents itself. To call an 
optimistic or utopian-sounding discourse ideological is to suggest that its 
function is not that of informing radical change but that of legitimating the 
status quo and the rule of those who preside over it. There is little doubt 
that epistemic-moral elitism—whether in the shape of the Confucian doc-
trine of kingly rule (wangdao) or in the guise of the Leninist idea of a Van-
guard—suits this function. Nor is it difficult to see how epistemic and moral 
optimism can be so construed as to fit in the same discourse of legitima-
tion: given that human beings have the epistemic and moral potential for a 
particular kind of authoritarian rule, those who are fit to rule are those who 
have best realized this potential, either on the strength of innate endow-
ment or by dint of effort and education. Such a discourse of legitimation has 
been a fixture in Chinese political culture.
5
 While an ideological discourse has epistemic content, this content 
is not meant to be taken at face value. Competent members of Chinese 
society all know intuitively how to react to ideological discourses: they do 
so by not taking the ostensible epistemic content of such discourses as an 
invitation for an epistemic response. One way in which a utopian discourse 
is different from an ideological one is that the former has a certain level of 
epistemic content that is meant to be taken with complete seriousness, 
since it is the real basis for or substance of the radical change envisioned. 
More often than not, however, and for reasons that we need not go into 
here, this content is not so conceived and presented as to invite epistemic 
scrutiny. Different from both ideological discourse and utopian discourse 
is a discourse of public reason, which is aimed at securing consensus 
in the public sphere through an informed exchange of reasons. Though 
4. This also helps explain the dearth of systematic reflections on “moral darkness” (781) 
in the Chinese tradition. Rather than put lack of discussion of “moral darkness” down to 
lack of insight into it, it seems more plausible to suggest that such discussion would sit 
ill not only with the odd utopian discourse, for obvious reasons, but also with the main-
stream ideological discourses of legitimation that have always rested on a highly positive 
account of the moral capacity of leaders regardless of the actual record.
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capable like utopian discourse of being put to ideological uses, a discourse 
of public reason nevertheless contains a potentially nonideological or anti-
ideological moment in its constitutive invitation for scrutiny and challenge.
 In terms of this tripartite distinction, I would hazard the following 
generalizations. First, the epistemological optimism of the (loosely called) 
Confucian tradition belongs largely to an ideological discourse that serves 
the function of legitimation. Second, the epistemological optimism of Chi-
nese communism is either part of an ideological discourse of legitimation 
or part of a utopian discourse that nevertheless (for reasons that we need 
not go into here) is inhospitable to epistemic scrutiny of its irreducibly epi-
stemic (utopian) content. Third, with the partial exception of Taiwan and 
Hong Kong in recent times, Chinese political culture for the most part has 
not been able to develop anything like a discourse of public reason.
 On the basis of these generalizations I will venture a yet more gen-
eral observation, and that is that political discourses in the Chinese tradi-
tion, including what Metzger calls discourse #1 (mainstream modern Chi-
nese political thought) and discourse #6 (Confucian political thought), are 
predominantly nonepistemic. This is the case even when, sometimes espe-
cially when, these discourses invoke some notion of truth; here, strikingly, 
the very employment of the discourse of truth is nonepistemic. To be a 
competent participant in Chinese political culture is to have learned how to 
relate to official discourses of truth. When one encounters an official appeal 
to objective truth (keguan zhenli ), universally valid truth (pubian zhenli ), 
laws of historical development (lishi guilü), science (kexue) in the broad 
sense of the true and the correct, and so on, one knows, pretheoretically, 
that this is not an invitation for discussion of the epistemic merits of the 
case in question but a conversation stopper, with varying degrees of risk 
involved if one reacts publicly as if it were such an invitation. To respond to 
such an appeal with an epistemic challenge or even query is to misconstrue 
the official speech act and commit a category mistake. To do so knowingly 
rather than naïvely is to commit a political mistake.
 This way of relating to the official discourse of truth has over time 
evolved into an intellectual habit whose application goes well beyond 
reactions to official discourse. Even outside official discourse, appeals are 
routinely made to truth and science and reason where the epistemic sub-
stance is only skin-deep. Academic discourse, one might surmise, should 
be an exception, if only because it is by nature theoretical rather than pre-
theoretical. It is somewhat more of an exception than is true of other types 
of discourse, to be sure, but a politically nonnaïve academic knows how to 
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toe the line on those topics over which official discourse has a time-honored 
prerogative or else to stay away from such topics altogether. Su Hao’s book 
on relations in the Asia-Pacific region, not least U.S.-Chinese relations, is a 
case in point. In his extensive discussion of Su’s book in chapter 14, Metz-
ger strikes me as having largely missed the point and spirit of the author’s 
overall speech act, as when he takes Su’s seeming confidence in the role of 
rationality in delivering a correct blueprint for international justice and in the 
moral good will of nations to implement such a blueprint to be “expressing 
what [Su and people like him] regard as a universal truth about political life” 
(780).
 Does this mean that scholars like Su are lying or at least saying 
something they don’t quite believe? Not exactly. The important thing is that 
the discourse of truth is employed in a certain way in Chinese political cul-
ture, especially though not exclusively on a certain range of largely officially 
monopolized topics, and Su is doing no more and no less than following 
this customary way of speaking. He is neither lying nor telling the truth as 
he sees it; he is just comporting himself—automatically and effortlessly—to 
an official or officially influenced discourse that uses the notion of truth in 
a predominantly ideological fashion. It is a crucial feature of such employ-
ment of the discourse of truth that appeal is made to epistemic notions in 
a way that is essentially not epistemic. To take this kind of appeal at its 
epistemic face value is to misunderstand the nature of the game on the 
model of a discourse of truth in which the epistemic dimension is meant to 
be taken with utter seriousness.
 This misunderstanding is quite understandable, however, in the case 
of scholarly employment of the discourse of truth, as by Su Hao. It is one 
thing for government officials to use the discourse of truth in a largely non-
epistemic way, given the nature of their assignment, or for people in their 
everyday activities to use the discourse of truth in a similar manner, given 
the pretheoretical character of such activities. It is something altogether 
different for scholars and intellectuals, in their capacity as such, to make 
seemingly theoretical use of epistemic notions in a largely nonepistemic 
way. One may be tempted to explain such behavior in terms of the pressure 
on scholars to toe the official line, and even today this line of explanation 
has not ceased to be true. But there is little doubt that this kind of pressure 
is much less in evidence than it used to be, and yet the truth-content of 
scholarly political discourse has not shot up proportionally. The sad thing 
is that comportment toward heavy political pressure over many years has 
caused an intellectual sclerosis that makes it difficult for many scholars to 
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use epistemic notions in a largely epistemic way, even when they are under 
little (or less) pressure to do otherwise.
 This intellectual sclerosis is by no means confined to the relatively 
short span of the People’s Republic of China. The pressure to parrot official 
political discourse was a long-standing feature of the Chinese tradition, a 
tradition that seldom rewarded stubbornly epistemic approaches to episte-
mic issues, least of all to the epistemic portions of political issues. Common 
to this tradition and Chinese communism is the importance of rote learn-
ing, an essentially nonepistemic way of approaching ostensibly epistemic 
matters, which is as characteristic of instruction in political subjects in com-
munist China as it was of the imperial examination system for selecting 
officials (kejü). Small wonder that the semiautomatic way of employing the 
discourse of truth is found in Taiwan and Hong Kong (treated by Metzger in 
chapters 3, 6, and 7, among others) as well. It attests to the power of this 
tradition that a philosopher as strong willed and intellectually well equipped 
as Tang Junyi (T’ang Chün-i), of whom Metzger gives detailed and often 
illuminating accounts in chapters 2 and 13, devoted a lifetime to the study 
and revival of Confucianism without ever subjecting it to the rigorous epi-
stemic scrutiny that a tradition in crisis calls for.
6
 It is in this light, I believe, that what Metzger calls the agenda of 
discourse #1 (mainstream modern Chinese political thought) needs to be 
approached. According to Metzger, this agenda consists of three ques-
tions: first, “the question of the extent to which a ‘total system of thought 
answering all key questions about human life’ has already been formed, 
and so that of the extent to which intellectual-moral dissonance should be 
tolerated” (90); second, the “question . . . of which doctrine or combination 
of doctrines or philosophies should be selected out of the variety of new 
and old, Chinese and foreign ideas to answer epistemological, ontological, 
cosmological, and historical questions” (101); and third, the “question . . . of 
which persons constitute the ‘enlightened’ group qualified to serve as the 
agents of Chinese progress” (102). Metzger then proceeds to make sense 
of modern Chinese political thought in terms of “different combinations of 
answers to the questions on [this agenda].”
For instance, a widespread kind of Chinese Marxism arose holding 
that a largely definitive system of thought was already available; that 
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it had been produced by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao; that 
the knowledge China today needed stemmed from the West and 
some current Chinese thought, not the Confucian tradition; that this 
correct theory was being implemented by the Chinese Communist 
Party; that it called for socialism rather than the liberal mix of democ-
racy and capitalism; and that some violence would be needed to 
accomplish the transformation for which it aimed. Within the Chi-
nese intellectual world, each of these propositions was prominently 
challenged on the Mainland by the 1980s, but the liberal, humanistic, 
and Sunist voices rejecting it had been alive all along. (102)
This analysis is not inaccurate as an account of the surface currents of 
modern Chinese political thought. The problem is that Metzger attaches far 
too much importance to the so-called agenda of discourse #1 in terms of 
epistemic substance and epistemic commitment. The frequent lack of unin-
hibited discussion about the questions on this agenda, the inhospitality to if 
not invariable proscription of epistemic challenges as indicators of political 
ill intent, the sheer epistemic sloppiness of seemingly intellectually seri-
ous statements within the agenda, and not least, the readiness with which 
the state ideological apparatus has been able to characterize the market 
reforms in recent decades as socialism with Chinese characteristics—all 
this tells us that discourse #1 is a game whose epistemic dimension is 
of exceptionally low importance and whose character must be grasped 
accordingly.
7
 The attenuated epistemic commitment in Chinese political culture, 
common to discourse #1 (mainstream modern Chinese political thought) 
and discourse #6 (Confucian political thought), is of a piece with an impor-
tant feature of the Chinese intellectual tradition at large. I mean a certain 
practice and spirit of working with nondisputables instead of subjecting 
nondisputables to the test of indisputability before they are allowed to count 
as knowledge. In view of this, I doubt that epistemological optimism is the 
right description of the Chinese outlook. If in a certain way of thinking the 
standard of knowledge is undemanding and therefore relatively easily met, 
it is hardly accurate to characterize this way of thinking in terms of episte-
mological optimism. Rather, for an epistemology to be really optimistic, it 
must contain a belief in the possibility of knowledge by a highly demanding 
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standard. This kind of optimism is a central constituent of what has come to 
be known as the Western philosophical tradition, beginning with Socrates’ 
introduction of certainty as the standard that distinguishes knowledge from 
mere opinion. Not surprisingly, epistemological optimism thus understood 
can lead over time to pessimistic conclusions about the scope and even 
the possibility of knowledge. But without epistemological optimism to begin 
with, how could there be epistemological pessimism as the disappointment 
of initial hopes?
 In the Chinese case, the lack of epistemological pessimism implies 
precisely the lack of a prior epistemological optimism. It is paradoxically this 
lack of epistemological optimism that has allowed the Chinese epistemo-
logical tradition to maintain a surface optimism. I call it surface optimism in 
the sense that it is not informed by an underlying quest for certainty as the 
hallmark of knowledge. As the trajectory of the Socratic tradition has repeat-
edly shown, the quest for certainty goes hand in hand with skepticism and 
has a uniquely powerful potential to lead to pessimistic conclusions about 
knowledge or at the very least to deflate overly confident claims regarding 
its possibility or scope. In the absence of this quest, it is not surprising that 
the main tenets of the Chinese intellectual tradition have enjoyed remark-
able stability. Nor is it hard to explain the longevity of the surface optimism, 
for what is ultimately corrosive of epistemological optimism is precisely the 
quest for certainty.
 In this light, epistemological optimism/pessimism is not a fundamen-
tal dividing line but only a derivative of the deeper distinction between the 
presence and absence of the quest for certainty. Given that Metzger is 
well aware of the importance of the quest for certainty (41, 44–46), it is 
somewhat surprising that he should operate most of the time at the level 
of surface outcomes rather than underlying causes. What he calls Western 
epistemological pessimism is the outcome of the quest for certainty turning 
5. I owe this line of thought to Friedrich Nietzsche, who has the insight both to see in 
Socrates “the prototype of the theoretical optimist who, with his faith that the nature 
of things can be fathomed, ascribes to knowledge and insight the power of a panacea, 
while understanding error as the evil par excellence” and to uncover the logic whereby 
“science, spurred by its powerful illusion, speeds irresistibly toward its limits where its 
optimism . . . suffers shipwreck.” See The Birth of Tragedy (and The Case of Wagner), 
trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), sec. 15.
6. For an account of the inner dynamic of the quest for certainty, see Martin Heidegger, 
“Metaphysics as History of Being,” in The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1973).
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the tables on its own products, whereas there are no comparable tables to 
be turned in the case of so-called Chinese epistemological optimism, and 
this is what gives these two paradigms their radically different trajectories.
 The absence of the standard of certainty does not, of course, pre-
vent appeals from being made to nondisputables in discourse #1 and 
discourse #6, nor does this absence prevent nondisputables from being 
loosely referred to in objectivist-sounding terms. It is nevertheless quite 
obvious that we are dealing with a distinct paradigm here. In this paradigm, 
regular appeals are made to truth and knowledge as a basis for normative 
principles and normative authority, and yet, as we saw earlier, there is rela-
tively little politically permitted room for informed epistemic challenge. What 
has just emerged from our discussion of the quest for certainty is that within 
the paradigm comprising discourses #1 and #6 there is also relatively little 
epistemic potential for Chinese society to negate its own ideas and convic-
tions through the sheer operation of its members’ will to truth (given appro-
priate social conditions)—the sort of potential that is the ultimate hallmark 
of epistemic seriousness.
8
 This picture has not been changed by the introduction of Western 
science to China. As it happened, modern science came to China largely 
ready-made, and so the broader quest for certainty that had originally 
helped give rise to science in the West did not have to come with it. While 
science as a mode of knowledge has since flourished in China, little of the 
quest for certainty—the spirit of science, as it were—has come to inform 
fields of intellectual inquiry other than science. Since the quest for certainty 
started life in China in a reified form, more as technique than as spirit, it 
is not surprising that it has been confined to the domain of science itself. 
If scientists, qua scientists, have learned to speak the narrowly precise 
language of science, the absence of the animating general quest for cer-
7. One example of such epistemic seriousness is atheism arrived at in a certain way. 
“Unconditional honest atheism (and its is the only air we breathe, we more spiritual men 
of this age!),” writes Nietzsche, “is . . . not the antithesis of that ideal [the ascetic ideal], as 
it appears to be; it is rather only one of the latest phases of its evolution, one of its terminal 
forms and inner consequences—it is the awe-inspiring catastrophe of two thousand years 
of training in truthfulness that finally forbids itself the lie involved in belief in God.” On the 
Genealogy of Morals (and Ecce Homo), trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale 
(New York: Random House, 1967), third essay, sec. 27.
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tainty means that other intellectual discourses, including those of scientists 
in their more general capacity as intellectuals, are largely untouched by 
the intellectual cleanliness that informs their Western counterparts at their 
best.
 Meanwhile, a notion of science at once vague and narrow has been 
valorized as a standard applicable to all intellectual inquiry and to all activi-
ties with an intellectual component. Thus, despite an apparently unbridge-
able divide between scientific and not strictly scientific modes of inquiry, 
what unites the two is a political-intellectual orthodoxy that attaches the 
approving epithet scientific to anything that meets with the approval of the 
establishment. That science (or scientism) reigns in this way is a measure 
of the absence of the general spirit of the quest for certainty.
 This does not invalidate what Metzger says about the Chinese 
response to the GMWER. Metzger’s observation that “the vast majority of 
the Chinese, including many intellectuals, remained simply unaware of or 
unresponsive to the GMWER” (51) needs to be explained, however, in the 
face of the readiness and considerable success with which modern sci-
ence, an important relative of the GMWER, has been embraced in China. 
A plausible explanation lies, I think, in that remarkable feature of a modern-
izing China which I have been commenting on, namely, that modern China 
has embraced science without quite taking on board the general spirit of 
the quest for certainty that has culminated in the GMWER. Thus, instead of 
saying, with Metzger, that modern Chinese intellectuals have rejected the 
GMWER, it would be more accurate to suggest that their selective import 
of one element of the GMWER, in the shape of science, has helped pro-
duce the epistemological confidence with which to reject the discomforting 
remainder.
9
 The same was largely true, until quite recently, of the introduction of 
liberalism in post-Mao China—liberalism construed broadly here to include 
also libertarianism, in line with Chinese usage. At the beginning, much of 
the liberalism that was in vogue consisted of ideological dogmas of liberal-
ism, not least of its libertarian variant. Much as in the case of science, lib-
eralism was being imported largely ready-made, in response to perceived 
Chinese realities, to be sure, but often without the benefit of some of the 
animating impulses that had kept Western liberalism reflecting on and, time 
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and again, reacting against its own earlier doctrines and emphases. But 
this situation has been changing—helped, perhaps, by the mutually chas-
tening if often fractious encounter between the Liberals (ziyoupai ) and the 
New Left (xinzuopai ). An increasing internal differentiation among Chinese 
liberals has brought with it an obvious gain in epistemic sophistication. Also 
discernable, the more so if we include also liberals based in Taiwan and 
Hong Kong who are increasingly part of the same debate, is the gradual 
emergence of the kind of internal dynamic that has caused much of Western 
liberal political philosophy to move from an emphasis on negative freedoms 
to advocacy of a broad range of social and economic rights in keeping with 
a more cogent and expansive interpretation of the underlying rationale for 
negative freedoms. If this trend continues, and if at the same time the New 
Left recovers the insistence, formerly quite explicit on the part of some of its 
members, on the importance of negative freedoms as necessary though far 
from sufficient conditions of a just society, the day may soon be over when 
the Liberals and the New Left are separated by a seemingly unbridgeable 
political divide. I for one believe such a development will be good for both 
sides and good for China. What, then, to make of Metzger’s striking claim 
that schools of Chinese liberalism are epistemically far removed from their 
Western counterparts (28–29, 144) and may, in fact, have less in common 
with the latter than with the other, anti- or nonliberal ideologies that have 
figured prominently in modern China (20–21)? The short answer is that this 
claim has less force now than when Metzger was prompted to make it but 
remains thought provoking.
10
 As the example of the initial introduction of liberalism in post-Mao 
China shows, what appear to be Chinese and Western versions of the 
same thing can in fact belong to two discourses that are separated by noth-
ing less than the Great Modern Western Epistemological Revolution. For 
Metzger, mainstream modern Western political thought, or discourse #2, is 
a product of the GMWER (89) and, as such, is marked by epistemological 
pessimism. I have called into question the appropriateness of describing 
the differences between discourse #1 (mainstream modern Chinese politi-
cal thought) and discourse #2 in terms of epistemological optimism and 
pessimism. I have alluded to one sense, however, in which it remains accu-
rate for Metzger to speak of pessimism in the case of discourse #2, that is, 
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pessimistic conclusions arrived at through the pursuit of an outlook and a 
standard that are not themselves pessimistic.
 Metzger is quite right to link epistemological pessimism to the quest 
for certainty and the resultant distinction between knowledge and opinion 
(41, 44). It is this quest that has led to paradigm shifts from, very roughly put, 
the premodern conception of knowledge to the modern and then the post-
modern. With the term Great Modern Western Epistemological Revolution 
Metzger designates essentially the second of these shifts, which has been 
recounted many times before. As Metzger tells the story, “the GMWER 
revealed a so-far unresolved problem—does the subjective side of thought 
outweigh the objective, or vice versa?—and in an arbitrary, intuitive, vague, 
but highly suggestive way alleged that the subjective side should gener-
ally be given the benefit of the doubt. In other words, sympathizing with 
this allegation, many Western intellectuals ‘turned the corner,’ so to speak, 
putting the burden of proof on those claiming to state objective truths” (47; 
see also 258–59). The GMWER’s application of the standard of certainty 
can lead to “maximum epistemological pessimism” (41–42)—the radical 
conclusion that nothing is sufficiently objectively certain to count as knowl-
edge. Some distance from this is a more moderate version of epistemologi-
cal pessimism, which increases the difficulty of access to truth and narrows 
the scope of what is good enough to count as knowledge, but less radically. 
By epistemological pessimism Metzger means sometimes the former and 
sometimes the latter.
 The important thing is that in either case epistemological pessimism 
is sufficient to lead to the positing of the fact/value distinction and the 
rejection of normative objectivism—in other words, to “the epistemological 
demotion of normative ideas from the status of true propositions or knowl-
edge to that of ideas to which the standard of truth is not applicable” (128). 
Once the fact/value distinction is drawn, the important question for politi-
cal philosophy concerns not so much the status of knowledge as that of 
values. As far as the latter is concerned, it would increase the perspicacity 
of his account, I think, if Metzger were to identify three distinct objects of 
8. For example, Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, trans. Geoff Benning-
ton and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Richard Rorty, 
“Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism,” in Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and James C. Edwards, The Plain Sense of 
Things: The Fate of Religion in an Age of Normal Nihilism (University Park, Pa.: Pennsyl-
vania State University Press, 1997), chap. 1.
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skepticism and hence of potential pessimism, namely: (a) the objectivity of 
values, (b) human epistemic powers to grasp values (whatever the status 
of values), and (c) human moral powers to act on values (whatever the 
status of values). It makes a big difference to ways of thinking about politics 
whether it is believed that there are objective values. Given a belief in the 
objectivity of values, it makes a big difference whether it is further believed 
that human beings have nearly perfect epistemic powers to comprehend 
such supposedly objective values, and given an affirmative answer to this 
question, whether it is yet further believed that they have nearly perfect 
moral powers to act on such supposedly objective values. Otherwise, in 
the absence of belief in the objectivity of values, the question still arises as 
to human moral powers in relation to whatever values happen to be con-
sidered worthy of implementation. At each point, there is room for a more 
or less optimistic answer and for a more or less pessimistic answer, and it 
does not necessarily take pessimism about the objectivity of values, still 
less a wholesale pessimism, to justify prudence in the design of political 
institutions. It is sufficient that human epistemic or moral powers, or both, 
are believed to be limited or fallible.
 John Stuart Mill, for example, whom Metzger cites as an example of 
epistemological pessimism (30), believed in the objectivity and priority of 
the good and yet argued for liberty and tolerance on the grounds of human 
epistemic and moral fallibility in relation to what is objectively good. What 
differentiates Mill as an exemplar of discourse #2 from a proponent of dis-
course #1 is not whether values are regarded as objective but whether (at 
least some) human agents are presumed to have infallible or nearly infal-
lible epistemic and moral powers in relation to values, and what institutions 
are necessary in the light of the assessment of human epistemic and moral 
powers. Likewise, John Rawls, another exemplar of epistemological pes-
simism in Metzger’s account, is able to justify what he calls “reasonable 
pluralism” through recourse to the idea of “burdens of judgment,” that is, 
the sources of disagreement among reasonable persons, without taking 
any position on the objectivity or otherwise of values.0 To take yet another 
example, also mentioned by Metzger (704), Lord Acton’s dictum that power 
corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely, an idea the likes of which 
9. As John Skorupski rightly points out, “objectivism, fallibilism, and pluralism can go 
together, and this is essential in a proper appreciation of Mill.” Ethical Explorations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 204n17.
10. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 
55.
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have significantly informed Western political institutions, consists of deep 
doubts about human moral powers quite irrespective of the ontological 
status of values and even of human epistemic powers in relation to values.
 What these examples suggest is that in making sense of the pessi-
mistic conclusions characteristic of discourse #2, it is necessary to distin-
guish carefully between recognition of human fallibility on the one hand and 
skepticism about objectivism on the other, and, in the case of the former, 
further between epistemic and moral fallibility. Although elements of all 
three are found in discourse #2, they do not necessarily go together and 
often do not actually go together. Where human moral fallibility is used as 
the main argument for prudence in the design of political institutions, the 
pessimism in question is not exactly epistemological. The other two cases 
do involve epistemology, but skepticism about objectivism is much more 
radical than belief in human epistemic fallibility. One could argue that of the 
three pessimistic conclusions that make up discourse #2, only skepticism 
about objectivism is quintessentially part of the GMWER. But then it is far 
from clear that modern Western political theorists generally subscribe to 
this conclusion. If anything, Ronald Dworkin’s well-known article “Objec-
tivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It” expresses a view that still enjoys 
greater currency among mainstream political philosophers. While recogniz-
ably different from discourse #1, most current Anglo-American political theo-
ries, not least liberal political theories, are decidedly not postmodernist.
11
 Metzger is ambivalent in his attitude toward discourse #2 and the 
GMWER. He has an entirely positive appraisal of the epistemic cautious-
ness and moral realism found in epistemological pessimism and yet shows 
a deep uneasiness with their deflationary effects on collective political psy-
chology. He sees discourse #1, on the other hand, as displaying a healthy 
dose of hopefulness and resoluteness necessary for motivating efforts to 
improve political life and yet lacking the sobriety and prudence to make 
such efforts successful. Metzger thus credits each of these two combi-
nations for exhibiting something valuable that the other lacks while taking 
issue with each for missing something just as valuable that the other has in 
abundance. In other words, discourse #1 and discourse #2 are both “partly 
irrational” (121), in opposite ways. This state of affairs Metzger dubs “the 
11. In Philosophy and Public Affairs 25, no. 2 (April 1996): 87–139.
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seesaw effect” (115–21), exemplified, in his view, by John Rawls, John Dunn, 
and Richard Rorty on the Western side, and by Tang Junyi and Ambrose 
King, among others, on the Chinese. It follows that whether the seesaw 
effect can be avoided is “the key issue in the search today for a rational 
political theory” (558). This is a bold and thought-provoking claim.
 I find it puzzling, however, that Metzger should conceive the prob-
lem of political rationality in terms of the distinction between the rationality 
of ends and instrumental rationality, and characterize the seesaw effect 
in terms of discourse #1 scoring high with respect to the former and dis-
course #2 with respect to the latter. This way of viewing the matter does 
not quite do justice to the complexities of either discourse. What Metzger 
seems to be hoping for, at bottom, is some combination of epistemological 
pessimism (from discourse #2) and political optimism (from discourse #1). 
But this cannot be the whole story, if only because the sheer combination 
of epistemological pessimism and political optimism seems intellectually 
incoherent and psychologically impracticable, while scaling both down until 
they meet in the middle seems scarcely more advisable.
 Nor is it clear why Metzger considers it irrational to place no more 
“emphasis on hopeful, resolute political action” than, say, Rawls or Dunn 
do (Metzger criticizes both in this regard). If by hopefulness about politics 
Metzger means the a priori kind of hope that treats belief in a minimal 
degree of human goodness and reasonableness as a necessary condi-
tion for human life, including human political life, to be at all worthwhile, 
then Rawls for one has it in abundance. Otherwise, rational hopefulness 
about politics depends on a proper assessment of experience. Here one 
can go some distance along with Metzger when he writes, “The heart of the 
problem . . . is how to combine an emphasis on hopeful, resolute political 
action with one on accuracy in depicting facts and caution in defining the 
scope of knowledge” (119). But if one takes “accuracy in depicting facts and 
caution in defining the scope of knowledge” seriously, one must leave it 
open whether the exercise of such epistemological virtues in the context of 
experience will lead to pessimistic political conclusions. It will not do to rule 
out such conclusions by simply suggesting, without non-question-begging 
argument, as Metzger does in his criticisms of Dunn (516–18, 537), that the 
standard of precision employed in reaching such conclusions is too high 
and inappropriate for the messy business of politics.
12. See, for example, Rawls’s “Concluding Reflection,” in The Law of Peoples (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 127–28.
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 A further problem I have is with Metzger’s argument for a “trans-
cultural critical perspective” (121), which is needed to overcome the see-
saw effect. Crucial to Metzger’s argument is the idea, repeatedly stated 
throughout the book, that “a discourse is a paradoxical combination of cul-
turally inherited premises with a reflexivity oriented to objective reality and 
universal issues” (77). Granted that human beings possess such reflexivity, 
the exercise of this capacity is still framed by premises whose historical 
givenness such reflexivity seems unable entirely to remove or transcend. If 
this is true of each and every discourse, the capacity for reflexivity in itself 
is not enough to support the belief that a transcultural critical perspec-
tive is possible. Metzger makes an important concession when he says 
that “there is no way to escape the fact that, ultimately, political rationality 
is dependent on a historically limited perspective” (126; see also 508). It 
seems to me that one must either weaken (or fine-tune) if not abandon this 
kind of concession or settle for something considerably less ambitious than 
the discovery of a transcultural critical perspective. In either case, critical 
reflexivity in political thinking needs some normative point of reference (say, 
nondomination or parity of participation), and what is lacking in Metzger’s 
otherwise very comprehensive conception is some explicit and fully devel-
oped account of such a point of reference and, by implication, of what is 
politically bad (say, in terms of domination or lack of parity). Without some 
such account and a better thought-through notion of critical reflexivity, “a 
thoroughgoing empiricism” (762) is unlikely to take the search for a trans-
cultural critical perspective very far.
12
 To be fair, it is possible to detect something like an overarching nor-
mative point of reference in the book, although Metzger does not provide 
much explicit argument for it. This is clear from the central importance he 
attaches to freedom, especially negative freedom, as an issue for political 
theory, and from the way in which he sees the chief implications of episte-
mological optimism and epistemological pessimism as bearing on the issue 
13. On nondomination as a political ideal and domination as the chief political evil, see 
Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 138–44. On parity of participation, see Nancy 
Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and 
Participation,” in Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange, by 
Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (London: Verso, 2003), 36–37.
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of freedom. According to Metzger, “discourse #1 and discourse #2 clash 
especially in that the former correlates epistemological optimism with thick 
parameters of individual freedom, while discourse #2 correlates epistemo-
logical pessimism with thin parameters of individual freedom” (25). Metz-
ger’s explanation for these correlations is very straightforward:
According to discourse #1, . . . the knowledge with which spiritually 
to transform the citizenry is available; the corrigible state can be 
expected eventually to respect the moral-intellectual virtuosi with this 
knowledge; and propagation of this knowledge through education 
can produce the thick moral parameters that will prevent the free-
dom of the three marketplaces [economic, intellectual, and political] 
from turning into license. According to discourse #2, however, maxi-
mizing this freedom even at the risk of its turning into license is the 
only hopeful way to try to improve society, because the knowledge 
needed to transform human nature and create thick parameters is 
unavailable, not to mention the Jacobinic dangers in trying to solder 
any such knowledge into an incorrigible political center. (26; see also 
30, 40, 67)
The underlying idea is that freedom is largely the opposite of conformity, 
while the underlying political value is that, as such, freedom should be maxi-
mized and conformity minimized, though by no means eliminated. Metz-
ger’s detailed descriptions and analyses add up to a picture that is more 
complex than this, of course. Still, missing from that picture is any realiza-
tion that freedom—that is, the interpretation of certain human practices in 
terms of the notion of freedom—may be a recipe precisely for conformity 
(among other things). Is it not a thought-provoking fact that those West-
ern societies in which freedom figures as a central moral and political value 
tend also to be the most stable? In these societies, freedom goes together 
not only with a certain orderliness but often also with a high degree of con-
formity and even uniformity, in such things as political opinion, lifestyle, and 
so on, notwithstanding certain conventional and rather neat divisions along 
lines of class, race, and gender. This coexistence of freedom and orderli-
ness and conformity suggests the need to unpack the notion of freedom, 
including Metzger’s specific notion of parameters of freedom, and, above 
14. This idea is made familiar by Michel Foucault, among others. For a good Foucauldian 
account, see Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999).
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all, the need for a different explanatory framework within which to place 
these notions.
 This is not the place to propose such a framework. What I would 
submit, however, is that the central question in thinking about this frame-
work should be conceived not in terms of more freedom or less freedom but 
in terms of how it is brought about that members of society are subjected 
to a social order in a manner that meets the individual’s need for agency 
sufficiently for the social order to be acceptable and stable. Given this way 
of posing the question, what Metzger calls thin and thick parameters of 
freedom can be interpreted as representing two different social strategies 
for satisfying the twin needs for individual agency and for social order. It is 
an oversimplification and, if carried too far, an illusion, that thin parameters 
of freedom favor individual agency, while thick parameters of freedom are 
conducive to social order. Both are ways of simultaneously meeting the 
need for individual agency and the need for social order. In catering to the 
latter need, both involve the production of conformity, just as in serving 
the former need, both must allow room for individual initiative and sub-
jectivity. Thus, we need to counterbalance our customary way of thinking 
about such issues by asking, with regard to those societies marked by so-
called thin parameters of freedom, in what ways such notions as freedom 
and autonomy are conducive (also) to conformity-producing social prac-
tices, and, with regard to societies marked by so-called thick parameters 
of freedom, how agents are constituted if not through such notions as free-
dom and autonomy.
 Whatever one’s answer turns out to be, it must not only address the 
question of how moral and political values correlate with social practices 
but also, and just as important, treat whatever correlations happen to exist 
as answering to the dual need for individual agency and social order. There-
fore, if modern Chinese and Western political philosophies differ profoundly 
(like Metzger, I believe they do), it is as comprehensive strategies for meet-
ing the dual need for individual agency and social order that they differ, not 
simply as doctrines regarding parameters of freedom.
13
 That in reality differences between Chinese and Western political 
values are so often represented as conflicting positions on freedom, even 
by as thoughtful a scholar as Metzger, is highly revealing. To me, this fact 
suggests that the two sides are involved in an ideological clash with a rather 
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low epistemic content. The cold war may be dead, but the old rhetoric is 
not, and the presence of a big country like China, which still calls itself 
socialist, helps keep that rhetoric alive, with its rich store of memories and 
affects. Though largely a misrepresentation of China and the United States 
and of the relation between them, the continuing ideological discourse in 
terms of freedom is itself an ideological reality, as it were, and, as such, a 
contributing or complicating factor in conflicts between the two sides.
 This ideological confrontation, one that takes place at the level of 
official as well as popular discourses, is not exactly between discourse #1 
and discourse #2, however. It is one thing to identify a discourse #1 and a 
discourse #2, both of them theoretical or academic discourses, and some-
thing else to claim that these discourses represent, respectively, main-
stream Chinese and Western thinking in general and political thinking in 
particular. Metzger himself is cautious enough to say that “the more empiri-
cal way to proceed is to refer only to these texts themselves, regarding 
them as constituting one cultural strand and leaving open the question of 
relations between this strand and the rest of society” (3). My impression—it 
is no more than an impression, for I have not carried out the kind of empiri-
cal study that a firmer conclusion would require—is that discourse #1 is 
fairly representative of modern Chinese thinking in general and political 
thinking in particular. Discourse #2, on the other hand, presents a far less 
straightforward case. While it represents a main strand of Western aca-
demic political thinking, there is little evidence to suggest that discourse #2, 
especially in its rejection of hard-core objectivism and its penchant for self-
questioning, is representative of the political thinking of either the govern-
ment or the citizenry as a whole. The confidence in their own correctness 
and righteousness often evinced by both of the latter seems rather close to 
that expressed by discourse #3. And to the extent that the everyday dis-
course employed by both is ideological and short on epistemic seriousness, 
it bears a strong resemblance to discourse #1, substantive differences not-
withstanding. The extent in question is quite large, in my view, and so I see 
the ideological conflict as taking place between two sides that are equally 
complacent and immune to serious epistemic questioning. Unlike Metzger, 
I believe the quest for certainty represented by discourse #2 at its best, with 
its will to truth and its potential for self-critique and even self-negation, can 
never be too rigorous, although it needs of course to be informed by more 
15. Discourse #3 is the objectivist variety of Western political theory that is largely unaf-
fected by the GMWER (88, 572).
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than purely epistemic concerns. On both sides of the Pacific, and this is 
especially true of official and popular discourses (and of discourse #1 as a 
whole, as explained earlier), there is much too little of this quest in political 
thinking.
 This is not to imply that a sharp rise in epistemic integrity and seri-
ousness on both sides, with regard to issues of international politics in par-
ticular, would automatically reduce the “deep shadow over the prospects 
for world peace in the next century” (2) or begin to “affect concrete political 
reality” (764). For the ideological conflict is far from being the only cause 
of this shadow. To begin with, China and the United States are both huge 
capitalist societies, informed alike by an ideology of never-ending growth 
and depending alike if to different degrees on such growth for much of 
the legitimacy of their respective governments. That this is the case is as 
important as the fact that capitalism takes significantly different cultural 
and political forms in the two countries. As superplayers in the shared 
global capitalist game, China and the United States are involved in an ever-
intensifying competition for markets and resources, although the econo-
mies of the two countries are already so connected as to make wholesale 
noncooperation, let alone confrontation, an extremely risky option for both 
sides. Moreover, unlike other countries, capitalist or otherwise, China (in 
prospect) and the United States (in actuality) are perhaps alone in having 
both the temptation and the wherewithal to achieve or (in the case of the 
United States) maintain a certain preeminence in the post–cold war world, 
fueled by an often intense and complacent nationalism in both countries. 
These two competitions—for markets and resources on the one hand and 
for overall preeminence on the other—are bound up in such a way that the 
compounded stakes can become very high and the potential for confronta-
tion correspondingly dangerous. Added to these stakes, sometimes to the 
point of inextricability, is the ideological clash discussed earlier, a clash that 
has the potential to turn an already intense competition for economic and 
political power into a perceived struggle between (free, capitalist) good 
and (authoritarian, communist) evil. Such a perception is quite misleading, 
and yet it is made seemingly plausible by China’s own insistence on char-
acterizing its market reforms in terms of socialism with Chinese character-
istics, just as it is kept alive on the American side by the subtle shift to the 
less overtly political yet equally discriminating (and mostly other-directed) 
discourse of human rights.
 In the face of this threefold conflict between China and the United 
States, parts of which exist or can exist between China and the West in 
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general, mere clarification and reduction of epistemic differences will not 
be enough. What is just as badly needed is a fresh reexamination of those 
forces and ideologies that, since China embarked on its current path, have 
come increasingly to shape the domestic and international agendas of both 
China and the United States despite ideologically engendered appear-
ances to the contrary.
